CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE-ZONING ORDINANCE THAT REQUIRES SPECIAL USE PERMIT IS VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE AS APPLIED TO THE

MENTALLY RETARDED-City of Cleburne Texas v. Cleburne Living

Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
Primitive societies believed that the maladies associated with
mental retardation were the result of demons and supernatural
powers imposing punishment.' Consequently, retarded persons
were subjected to bizarre and brutal tortures in order to exorcise
the evil spirits. 2 In the thirteenth century, England fashioned its
laws to provide for the allocation of the disabled person's property and thus completely ignored the benefits of supervision or
habilitation of the person.' If a mentally disabled person was legally defined as an "idiot" under English law, then the King often
seized his property, voided his contracts, and denied judicial
remedies for wastage of his estate.4 Those who were poor be5
came part of the "mass of deviants."
English law helped to shape the attitudes of Americans in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 6 Dehumanization of
the retarded continued in this country with compulsory eugenic
sterilization laws, 7 total exclusion from public schools, and involuntary institutionalism with grotesque living conditions. 8 However, by the 1950's and 1960's legal reforms were initiated as a
1 S. BRAKEL, J. PARRY

&

B. WEINER, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW, 9

(3d ed. 1985) [hereafter S. BRAKEL].
2 Id.
3 S. HERR, RIGHTS AND ADVOCACY FOR RETARDED PEOPLE, 9-10 (1983). See S.
BRAKEL, supra note 1, at 10-11.
4 S. HERR, supra note 3, at 10-15. The English law marked a distinction between "lunatics" and "idiots." Id. at 10. "Idiots" were deemed to have no "understanding of their nativity" and therefore were deprived of their property. Id. In
comparison, "lunatics" were not deprived of their property. Id. To evade the harsh
legal consequences and financial hardships imposed on "idiots," juries were reluctant to render verdicts of mental retardation. Id. at 11. Thus distinctions between
"lunatics" and "idiots" were intentionally blurred by the juries. Id. English law
shaped the prejudices of the American colonists. Id. at 15. The colonists also
blurred the distinctions between the mentally retarded and mentally ill and often
confused or grouped together these two types of people in the law. Id. Even today,
mental retardation is confused with mental illness. Id.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 27; see also Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) ("The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes.
Three generations of imbeciles is enough.") (citation omitted).
8 S. HERR, supra note 3, at 15-28.
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result of the cultural shift which recognized the human rights and
abilities of retarded persons.' In the 1970's substantial improvements were made in the area of care, treatment, rehabilitation,
and community services for the mentally disabled.' Although
legal reforms ensure some basic civil rights for the retarded, stereotypical attitudes and fears toward this group continue to persist." The mentally disabled "pose a classic example of a
'discrete and insular minority,' a minority for whom the conventional political processes have failed."' 2
The prejudices the mentally retarded continue to encounter
are exemplified in City of Cleburne Texas v. Cleburne Living Center,
Inc. '" Cleburne Living Center, Inc. (CLC), engaged in the business of providing supervised group homes for mentally retarded
persons. "4 In July 1980, Jan Hannah, the Vice President and major shareholder in CLC, purchased a building located on Featherston Street in Cleburne, Texas.' 5 Hannah proposed to lease the
building to CLC for the purpose of housing thirteen mildly to
moderately retarded men and women. 16 CLC staff members
were to provide twenty-four hour supervision and to instruct the
residents in household maintenance, daily chores, obtaining jobs
in the community, using transportation, enjoyment of leisure activities, and other "academics related to independent living."' 7
Before the operation commenced, however, CLC encountered
difficulties complying with the city's zoning ordinance.' 8
9 Id. at 38.

10 S. BRAKEL, supra note 1, at 607.
11 S. HERR, supra note 3, at 237-50.

12 Id.; see also United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4
(1938), where Justice Stone noted that "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of
those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and
which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry." Id.
13 City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
14 Cleburne Living Center, Inc. v. City of Cleburne Texas, 726 F.2d 191, 193
(5th Cir. 1984), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
15 Id. For convenience, the Supreme Court refers to plaintiffs Jan Hannah and
CLC as "CLC." Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 435 n. 1.
16 Id. at 435. The Featherston building contains four bedrooms and two baths.
The home is located on a corner lot and across the street from a public junior high
school which is also attended by thirty mentally retarded children. Id.
17 Cleburne, 726 F.2d at 193. The home was classified as a Level I Intermediate
Care Facility and was to be extensively regulated by statutes, ordinances and codes,
established and administered by the United States Department of Health and
Human Resources, the Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation and the Texas Department of Health. CLC intended to follow all applicable
guidelines. Id.

18 Id. at 194.
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Since the Featherston Street location was classified as an
apartment house district, the use of the property was regulated
by the Code of City Ordinances, Sections 8 and 16.1 9 Under Section 8 of the zoning ordinance, "[h]ospitals, sanatoriums, nursing homes or homes for the convalescents or aged, other than for
the insane or feeble-minded or alcoholics or drug addicts," were
permitted uses in the district.2 0 In September 1980, the city advised CLC that the Featherston home would be classified as a
"hospital for the feeble-minded" and therefore subject to Section 8 of the zoning ordinance. 2 The classification invoked the
operation of Section 16 which mandated that before any of the
proscribed uses mentioned in Section 8 were initiated, the
Cleburne City Council had to issue a "special use permit. '"22 In
October 1980, the city council denied the special use permit application pursuant to the decision made at a public hearing. 23
CLC instituted suit in the Federal District Court for the
Northern District of Texas, challenging the validity of Sections 8
and 16 of the zoning ordinance. 24 Naming as defendants the City
of Cleburne, individual city employees, and council members, the
19 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 436 n.3.
20 Cleburne, 726 F.2d at 193. More specifically, Section 8 of Cleburne's zoning

ordinance permits the following uses in an R-3 zone:
1. Any use permitted in District R-2.
2. Apartment houses, or multiple dwellings.
3. Boarding and lodging homes.
4. Fraternity or sorority houses and dormitories.
5. Apartment hotels.
6. Hospitals, sanitoriums, nursing homes or homes for convalescents
or aged, other than for the insane or feeble-minded or alcoholics or drug
addicts.
7. Private clubs or fraternal orders, except those whose chief activity is carried on as a business.
8. Philanthropic or eleemosynary institutions, other than penal institutions.
9. Accessory uses customarily incident to any of the above
uses.

...

Id. (emphasis in original).
21 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 436-37.
22 Id. at 436. More specifically, under Section 16(9) of Cleburne's zoning ordinance, the use of property for "[h]ospitals for the insane or feebleminded, or alcoholic or drug addicts, or penal or correctional institutions," require that the city
Council issue a special use permit after the recommendation of the Cleburne Planning and Zoning Commission and a public hearing. The special use permit had to
be renewed annually. Id. at 436 n.2.
23 Id. at 437. This was the second time CLC was denied the special use permit.
In July 1980, the Cleburne Planning and Zoning Commission also denied the permit pursuant to the decision of a hearing. Id. at 437 n.4.
24 Id. at 432.
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plaintiff alleged that the ordinance, as written and as applied,2 5
was violative of the equal protection clause of the United States
Constitution. 26 The district court determined that because
neither a fundamental right2 7 nor a suspect classification 28 was
involved, minimal level scrutiny29 was appropriate.30 Reasoning
that the statute bore a rational relation to the city's legitimate
objectives and interests in the welfare of proposed residents and
the adjoining neighborhood, the court declared the ordinance
constitutional. 3 '
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held
that heightened judicial review was applicable and reversed the
trial court.3 2 The circuit court held that the ordinance restricted
the availability of group homes which were a very important benefit, although not a fundamental right, 33 and the mentally retarded were a quasi-suspect class. 34 The court concluded that
25 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the .. . equal protection of the laws.
26 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 437.
27 See infra note 114 and accompanying text.
28 See id.

29 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 437.
30 See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
31 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 437. The district court did find that the ordinance discriminated against the mentally retarded and stated that "[ilf the potential residents of the Featherston Street home were not mentally retarded, but the home
would be was the same in all other respects, its use would be permitted under the
city's zoning ordinance." Id. The district court found further that the city council's
decision "was motivated primarily by the fact the residents of the home would be
persons who were mentally retarded." Id. However, since the district court found
that the city had a legitimate interest, the ordinance was upheld under minimal
scrutiny. Id.
32 Cleburne, 726 F.2d at 202.
33 Id. at 199. The circuit court relied on the trial court's finding that:
• . .[g]roup homes currently are the principal community living alternatives for persons who are mentally retarded. The availability of such a
home in a community is an essential ingredient of normal living patterns
for persons who are mentally retarded, and each factor that makes such
group homes harder to establish operates to exclude persons who are
mentally retarded from the community.
The Fifth Circuit also relied on Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) for the proposition that, although not a fundamental right, education is an important benefit and
statutes affecting it would be examined under heightened scrutiny. Cleburne, 726
F.2d at 199.
34 Id. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the mentally retarded are considered
"quasi-suspect" as they suffered "from a history of unfair and often grotesque mistreatment, political powerlessness, and immutability.
Id. at 197-98. See infranote 139 and accompanying text.
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the ordinance failed to pass heightened review because the ordinance was not substantially tailored to any important state
interests.3 5
On petition by the City of Cleburne, the United States
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Fifth Circuit insofar
as it invalidated the ordinance as applied to the proposed residents of the Featherston home but vacated the rest of the decision.3 6 The Cleburne Court held that retarded persons do not
carry any of the indicia of quasi-suspect classifications.3 7 However, while intermediate scrutiny was inappropriate, the class was
not entirely devoid of protection under equal protection analysis.38 The Court concluded that requiring a special use permit
for the proposed residents of the Featherson home was unconstitutional because there was no rational basis for their exclusion.3 9
The equal protection clause was originally invoked solely for
the purpose of countering the discriminatory effects of slavery on
the "negro race". 4 ° The Supreme Court of the United States has
indicated that it would be hard-pressed to imagine any other set
of circumstances which would fall within the purview of the
clause other than those involving race. 4 1 For instance, an initial
application of the clause involved a case where a Louisiana statute prohibited all entities other than the corporation created
under the statute from engaging in activities connected with the
slaughtering of animals.42 Upholding the statute and refusing to
expand the scope of the provision, Justice Miller stated that the
equal protection clause was "so clearly a provision for that race
and that emergency, that a strong case would be necessary for its
application to any other."'4 3 In contrast to the multi-dimensional
Cleburne, 726 F.2d at 202.
Cleburne, 432 U.S. at 447.
Id. at 442-47.
Id. at 446.
39 Id. at 450.
40 See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 394, 407 (1873). The Court
opined that the "existence of laws in the states where the newly emancipated negroes resided, which discriminated with gross injustice and hardship against them
as a class, was the evil to be remedied by this clause.
Id. at 410.
4' Id.
42 Id. at 397.
43 Id. at 410. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3,45 (1883) (Harlan,J., dissenting;
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 664, 665 (1880). The majority's narrow interpretation of the equal protection clause in the Slaughter-House Cases was in fact
aligned with the historical setting at that time. See F. BEYTAGH & P. KAUPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS, 567 (5th ed. 1980) [hereafter cited as F.
BEYTAGH]. The Civil War Amendments which included the thirteenth, fourteenth
and fifteenth amendments recognized certain basic rights of the recently emanci35
36
37
38
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and far-reaching character of the equal protection clause as applied today, it was first construed narrowly invalidating relatively
few legislative schemes.4 4
One of the earliest cases where the equal protection clause
was used to invalidate a state statute was Yick Wo v. Hopkins.45 In
Yick Wo, a Chinese alien who owned a laundry business petitioned for a writ of habeaus corpus. 46 The petitioner had been
imprisoned for failing to pay a fine propounded upon him for
violating a San Francisco ordinance which deemed it unlawful for
any person to operate a laundry in a wooden building without
securing a license from the board of supervisors.47 The peti
tioner, a Chinese alien, operated a laundry business in the same
premises for twenty-two years.48 After receiving a satisfactory
rating from health officials concerning the conditions of his
premises, he petitioned the board of supervisors for a license.49
pated negroes. Despite the broad and sweeping language of the fourteenth amendment, it was applied only with a single objective. As a result, the Slaughter House
Cases impeded the development of those provisions as "viable protections of individual rights for decades to come." Id.
44 See, e.g., Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 3; Strauder, 100 U.S. at 664; Slaughter
House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 394.
45 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
46 Id. at 356-57.
47 Id. at 357. The pertinent provisions of the San Francisco ordinance are set
out as follows:
Order No. 1569, passed May 26, 1880, prescribing the kind of
buildings in which laundries may be located. "The people of the city
and county of San Francisco do ordain as follows:
SEC. 1. It shall be unlawful, from and after the passage of this order, for any person or persons to establish, maintain, or carry on a laundry within the corpoiate limits of the city and county of San Francisco
without having first obtained the consent of the board of supervisors,
except the same be located in a building constructed eight of brick or
stone.
SEC. 3. Any person who shall violate any of the provisions of this
order shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction
thereof shall be punished by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars, or by imprisonment in the county jail not more than six months, or
by both such fine and imprisonment."
Order No. 1587, passed July 28, 1880, the following section:
SEC. 68. It shall be unlawful, from and after the passage of this
order, for any person or persons to establish, maintain, or carry on a
laundry within the corporate limits of the city and county of San Francisco without having first obtained the consent of the board of supervisors, except the same be located in a building constructed either of brick
or stone."
Id. at 357-58.
48 Id. at 358-59.
49 Id.
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All of the petitions of those who were not of Chinese descent,
except one, secured a license from the board.50 In contrast, all
the petitions of Chinese aliens, including the petitioner's, were
denied. 5
Justice Matthews initially recognized that the Court was powerless to decide the lawfulness of the petitioner's imprisonment. 52 The Court limited its evaluation to the constitutionality
of the ordinance and its administration.53 In overturning the
California Supreme Court's decision, Justice Matthews stated
that the ordinance conferred "naked and arbitrary power to give
54
or withhold consent not only as to places, but as to persons."
The Justice asserted that the officials were unfairly permitted to
exercise their will in a purely arbitrary fashion disregarding guidance and restraint.55 Therefore, the Court reasoned that while
a law may appear neutral, if it is administered unequally to persons in similar circumstances, it will be struck down. 56
Although by the turn of the century the Court had not yet
formulated the concept of tiered scrutiny, it had already begun to
formulate the theory of modern rational basis review.5 7 In Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co. ,58 the owner of the Natural Carbonic
Gas Company sought to enjoin the state of New York from enforcing a statute which prohibited the pumping of mineral waters
holding an excess of carbonic acid gas from wells bored or
drilled into the rock for the purposes of "extracting, collecting,
compressing, liquifying or vending such gas as a commodity." 59
50 Id.

51 Id. The California Supreme Court denied the writ of habeaus corpus, holding
that the ordinances were not in "contravention of common right or unjust or unequal, partial or oppressive." Id. at 360.
52 Id. at 365-66.
53 Id. at 366.

54 Id. The Court poignantly stated, "[flor, the very idea that one man may be
compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right essential to
the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any
county where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself." Id. at 370.
55 Id. at 366-67.
56 Id.

at 373-74.

57 Under rational basis review, states were afforded wide latitude in creating
statutory classifications affecting economic concerns. See Michigan Central R.R.
Co. v. Powers, 201 U.S. 245, 293 (1906); Columbus S. Ry. Co. v. Wright, 151 U.S.
470, 478-79 (1894); Pacific Express Co. v. Seibert, 142 U.S. 339, 351-53 (1892);
Bell's Gap R.R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232, 237 (1890).
58 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
59 Id. at 62-66. The New York Statute approved May 20, 1908, provided:
Pumping, or otherwise drawing by artificial appliance, from any well
made by boring or drilling into the rock, that class of mineral waters
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The plaintiff owned twenty-one acres of land containing the class
of mineral waters specified in the statute. 60 Consequently, the
plaintiff alleged that the statute deprived it both of the rightful
use of the property and of equal protection of the laws, in contravention of the fourteenth amendment. 6 ' The circuit court dismissed the claim.62 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court
affirmed.63
In its decision, the Court articulated several rules of construction to be applied in all equal protection claims. 64 First, it
noted that a state is permitted a wide scope of discretion, pursuant to its police powers, to make reasonable statutory classifications.6 5 Secondly, classifications having some reasonable basis
are not deemed offensive merely because they lack "mathematical nicety" or result in some degree of inequality. 66 Thirdly, if
any reasonable basis existed at the time the law was enacted, the
classifications will be deemed valid.6 7 Lastly, the Court declared
that the party challenging
a classification sustains the burden of
68
proving its invalidity.
holding in solution natural mineral salts and an excess of carbonic acid
gas, or pumping, or by any artificial contrivance whatsoever in any manner producing an unnatural flow of carbonic acid gas issuing from or
contained in any well made by boring or drilling into the rock, for the
purpose of extracting, collecting, compressing, liquifying or vending
such gas as a commodity otherwise than in connection with the mineral
water and the other mineral ingredients with which it was associated, is
hereby declared to be unlawful.
Id. at 62-63 (citation omitted).
60 Id. at 61.

61 Id. at 64. The plaintiff also alleged that the statute deprived it of its property
without due process of law. The Court, in upholding the statute, stated that the
State has the power to prohibit an owner from pumping on his land, water, gas, and
oil which injuriously affected the subterranean supply shared by other owners. Id.
at 74.
62 Id. at 64.
63 Id. at 83.

64 Id. at 78.
65 Id.

66 Id. This principle has been frequently employed by the Court in equal protection analysis under the rational basis review. See United States R.R. Retirement Bd.
v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 175 (1980); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427
U.S. 307, 314 (1976);Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546 (1972); Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 475 (1970); Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940).
67 Lindsley, 220 U.S. at 78-79. This standard is also a component of rational basis review currently employed by the Supreme Court. See Fritz, 449 U.S. at 174-75;
Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 111 (1979); Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 485.
68 Lindsley, 220 U.S. at 78-79. This concept is often articulated by the Supreme
Court under rational basis review. See Vance, 440 U.S. at 111; McGinnis v. Royster,
410 U.S. 263, 274 (1973); United States v. Maryland Savings Ins. Corp., 400 U.S. 4,
6 (1970); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955).
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Applying those principles to the case at bar, the Lindsley
court determined that the plaintiff failed to sustain its burden of
proving that the statute was arbitrary.6" The Court observed that
the bill did not disclose the reasons for making such classifications.7 ° Moreover, the nature of the problem was beyond the
range of common knowledge or judicial notice. 7 ' The Court

concluded that absent any contradictory evidence, there may exist a substantial difference between pumping from wells bored or
drilled into the rock and pumping from wells not penetrating the
rock as opposed to pumping for the purpose of collecting and
vending gas apart from the water and pumping for other purposes.72 Based on the briefs of counsel and oral arguments, the
Court found that the proscribed conduct injuriously affected the
common water supply. 73 Thus, the classification was supported
by a reasonable basis.

4

From the outset, rational basis analysis in the context of the
equal protection clause has been applied inconsistently by the
Supreme Court. For instance, the Lindsley Court affirmed the
premise that states are granted a wide scope of discretion pursuant to their police powers. 7 5 Yet a few years later, in F. S. Royster
Guano Co. v. Commonwealth of Virginia,76 the Court substantially

narrowed the states' discretion in the areas of economic concern. 77 In Royster, the plaintiff corporation challenged the validity
of two statutes which imposed a tax on income derived from
business conducted within and without state boundaries.78
69
70

Lindsley, 220 U.S. at 79-80.
Id. at 79.

71

Id.

72

Id.

73 Id. at
74 Id. at

80.
81.

Id. at 78.
253 U.S. 412 (1920). Today, it is generally an accepted proposition of law
that only the most minimal amount ofjudicial scrutiny will be applied to economic
legislation. See Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); Cohen v.
Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949); Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co.
75
76

v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580 (1935).
See Royster, 253 U.S. at 417.
Id. at 413-14. State officials imposed tax on income derived within and without the state on local corporations by mandate of c.472 of the Virginia Acts of 1916
which imposed an
income tax on 1 per centum upon 'the aggregate amount of income of
each person or corporation,' subject to specified deductions and exemptions; including in income 'all profits from earnings of any partnership
or business done in or out of Virginia' and also 'all other gains and profits derived from any source whatever.'
77
78
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Under the statute, however, corporations that owed their existence to the same laws but derived income from business done
solely without the state were exempt from such taxes.79 Plaintiff
corporation was created by and existed under the laws of Virginia
for the purpose of manufacturing and selling commercial fertilizer.8 ° Plaintiff reported income for the purpose of taxation
based upon income derived only within state limits, and omitted
income derived from out-of-state business.81 Officials, however,
added the latter amount and assessed taxes based on the aggregate. 2 The plaintiff challenged the statute as violative of the
equal protection clause.8 3
In reaching its decision, the Court enunciated several basic
rules of law.8 4 It recognized that the equal protection clause did
not forbid states from resorting to classifications for purposes of
legislation.8 5 States are afforded a wide range of discretion, particularly in creating classifications of property for tax purposes.8 6
Departing from precedent, the Royster Court held that classifications must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must "rest upon
some ground of difference having a fair and substantialrelation to
the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumRoyster, 253 U.S. at 413-14. This statute was considered in conjunction with c. 495
of the Virginia Acts of 1916 which read as follows:
Whereas certain corporations have been organized under the laws of
Virginia, and it is anticipated that certain others will be organized thereunder, which do no business within this State; therefore - 1. Be it enacted by the general assembly of Virginia, that no income tax nor ad
valorem taxes, State or local shall be imposed upon the stocks, bonds,
investments, capital or other intangible property owned by corporations
organized under the laws of this State which do no part of their business
within this State....
Royster, 253 U.S. at 414.
79

80
81
82

Id. at 412.
Id.

Id. at 413.
Id.

Id. The Corporation Court of the City of Norfolk dismissed plaintiff's allegathat an arbitrary burden was placed upon domestic corporations doing busiboth within and without of state as violative of the equal protection clause.
Supreme Court of Appeals of the State affirmed the judgment of the CorporaCourt. Id.
84 See id. at 415.
83

tion
ness
The
tion

85
86

Id. at 415.

Id. The Supreme Court had long since recognized that states were afforded
wide latitude in creating statutory classifications with respect to economic concerns
under equal protection analysis. See Northwestern Life Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin, 247
U.S. 132, 139 (1918); Citizens Tel. Co. v. Fuller, 229 U.S. 322, 329 (1913): Keeney
v. New York, 222 U.S. 525, 536 (1912); Michigan Cen. R.R. Co. v. Powers, 201 U.S.
245, 293 (1880); Bell's Gap R.R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232, 237 (1880).
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stanced shall be treated alike." ' s7

The Court then examined whether a substantial difference
between the two classes of domestic corporations existed.8 8 It
recognized that the purpose in exempting corporations from income taxes when they do no business within Virginia was based
on the notion that they derive no governmental protection from
the state warranting the imposition of taxes.8 9 The Royster Court
observed that to hold otherwise would be unjust because such a
corporation was also subject to taxation in the state where its income-producing business occurred.9" However, the Court found
that no conceivable basis existed to justify why the exemptions
did not apply with "equal or greater force" to domestic corporations producing income both within and without the state.9 '
Under the standard of review articulated in Royster, the Court
held that in the absence of a fair and substantial relation to the
state's proffered objective, the classifications drawn were illusory,
arbitrary, and void.92
In comparison to previous case law, Royster transformed the
equal protection clause into a powerful tool with which to invalidate economic regulations. However, its utility was short lived.93
In the 1930's and 1940's, litigants, asserting equal protection violations more frequently as a result of the "demise" of the due
process commercial concept, met with little success.94 The modern rational basis test emerged from these cases. 95 Since then,
rational basis has been extended to cases involving social conRoyster, 253 U.S. at 415.
See id. at 415-17.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 415-16.
91 Id. at 416. More specifically, the Court noted that local corporations receive
no more protection from the State in which they are located with respect to business derived outside the State than corporations which fall within the exempt class
under the statute. Id. Ironically, the State receives a greater benefit from local
corporations which do business within and without the State, yet these local corporations are penalized. Id.
92 Id. at 415-17. Justice Brandeis, with whomJustice Holmes concurred, sharply
criticized the more stringent standard employed by the Court in his dissenting
opinion. Id. at 417 (Brandeis,J., dissenting). TheJustice stated that the fourteenth
amendment did not preclude reasonable classifications of property, occupations,
persons or corporations for the purpose of taxation. It only prohibited inequality
resulting from clearly arbitrary action, especially hostile discrimination against certain groups. Id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
93 F. BEYTAGH, supra note 43, at 891.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 891-97. See Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949);
Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'r, 330 U.S. 552 (1947); Tigner v. Texas,
87
88
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cerns where a suspect classification or a fundamental right is not
at stake. 96
While the Court generally adopts a deferential posture when
social or economic concerns are at stake, the Court, at times, has
relied on the more rigorous standard of review to strike down a
statute affecting an unpopular group. For instance, in United
States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,9 7 a class action was instituted seeking declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against
the enforcement of the Food Stamp Act of 1964, as amended in
197 1.9 The food assistance program was intended to aid needy
families and was initially applied to a group of related or non-related
individuals who lived "as one economic unit sharing common
cooking facilities and for whom food [was] customarily purchased
in common."' 9 Subsequently, in 1971, Congress reassessed the
term "household" to mean only groups of related individuals.' 00
In Moreno, one of the plaintiffs was an elderly diabetic woman
who was denied federal assistance, despite her poverty, because
310 U.S. 141 (1940); Borden's Farm Prod. Co. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 251 (1936);
Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley Tobacco Growers Ass'n, 276 U.S. 71 (1928).
During this period, the "two-tiered" level of review emerged. While the cases
involving economic regulation developed the rational basis test, suits involving suspect classifications such as race developed the strict scrutiny test. See Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). AfterJapanese civilians were ordered to
assembly centers for detention during World War II, the Court, in articulating the
test for strict scrutiny, held "all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a
single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that Courts must subject them to the most
rigid scrutiny. Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of
such restrictions." Id. at 216. Despite the rigid review granted by the Court, the
order was upheld due to the war-time necessity. Id. at 219.
96 See infra notes 97 to 135 and accompanying text.
97 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
98 Id. at 532.
99 Id. at 530 (citation omitted) (footnote omitted).
100 Id. The Secretary of Agriculture promulgated regulations stating the following: "(jj) 'Household' means a group of persons, excluding roomers, boarders, and
unrelated live-in attendants necessary for medical, housekeeping, or child care reasons, who are not residents of an institution or boarding house, and who are living
as one economic unit sharing common cooking facilities and for whom food is customarily purchased in common: Provided, That:
"(1) When all persons in the group are under 60 years of age, they are all
related to each other; and
"(2) When more than one of the persons in the group is under 60 years of age,
and one or more other persons in the group is 60 years of age or older, each of the
persons under 60 years of age is related to each other or to at least one of the
persons who is 60 years of age or older. "It shall also mean (i) a single individual
living alone who purchases and prepares food for home consumption, or (ii) an
elderly person as defined in this section, and his spouse." Id. at 530 n.3.
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she lived with an unrelated family. 10 ' The district court held that
the "unrelated provision" of the amendment created an "irrational classification" in violation of the "equal protection compoAmendment."' 10 2
nent of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
03
The United States Supreme Court affirmed.1
Justice Brennan, in delivering the opinion of the Court,
noted that a legislative classification will be upheld if it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. 10 4 The Justice posited
that a statute is not offensive simply because it results in mathematical imprecision. 105 The Moreno Court then examined the
governmental interest by reviewing the congressional policy of
the Food Stamp Act. 10 6 The purpose was "to safeguard the
health and well-being of the Nation's population and raise levels
of nutrition among low-income households.' 0 7
The Court failed to find any legitimate governmental interest to justify the classification.10 8 The Moreno Court noted that
the legislative history of the amendment to the Food Stamp Act
revealed that it was designed to prevent "hippies" and "hippie
communes" from participating in the food assistance program. i09
101 Id. at 531.
102 Id. at 532-33. The Court noted that although the fifth amendment does not
contain an equal protection clause, the fifth amendment "forbids discrimination
that is 'so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.' " Id. at 533 n.5 (citations
omitted).
103 Id. at 533.
104 Id. at 534.
105 Id. at 538.
106 See id. at 533.
107 Id. (citation omitted). The declaration of policy further stated:
The Congress hereby finds that the limited food purchasing power of
low-income households contributes to hunger and malnutrition among
members of such households. The Congress further finds that increased utilization of food in establishing and maintaining adequate national levels of nutrition will promote the distribution in a beneficial
manner of our agricultural abundances and will strengthen our agricultural economy, as well as result in more orderly marketing and distribution of food. To alleviate such hunger and malnutrition, a food stamp
program is herein authorized which will permit low-income households
to purchase a nutritionally adequate diet through normal channels of
trade.
Id. at 533-34.
108 Id. at 535-36. The Court stated that " '[tihe relationships among persons
constituting one economic unit and sharing cooking facilities have nothing to do
with their ability to stimulate the agricultural economy by purchasing farm surpluses, or with their personal nutritional requirements.'" Id. at 535 (quoting
United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 345 F. Supp. 310, 313 (D.D.C.
1972)).
109 Id. at 534.
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The majority, however, stated that the concept of equal protection mandates that "a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate government
interest.""
The Court, in declaring the statute invalid, reasoned that the real effect of the amendment was to exclude those
groups who were so desperately in need of assistance that they
could not even afford to alter their living arrangements to maintain eligibility. "'
The inconsistent application of rational basis review was
again demonstrated in a case involving an unpopular group. In
contrast to Moreno, however, the Court articulated the more deferential and traditional standard of rational basis review while
upholding the statute at issue in MassachusettsBoard of Retirement v.
Murgia." 2 In Murgia, a statute mandating the automatic retirement of state police upon reaching the age of fifty was challenged
as violative of the equal protection clause. 1 3 In a per curiam
opinion, the Court deemed rational basis review appropriate because the aged were not considered a suspect class."14 The
110 Id. The Court further dismissed the government's claim that the amendment
was initiated to minimize fraud. The Moreno Court observed that special safeguards
and penalties were built into the statute to prevent fraud. The unrelated provision
was not rationally calculated to prevent that abuse and combat similar concerns. Id.
at 535-36.
11' Id. at 537. Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger, in a dissenting
opinion, sharply criticized the majority for expanding the scope of rational basis
review. Id. at 545-47 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting). The dissentingJustice argued that
the majority exceeded its authority by ruling against the adoption of the limitation
placed in the Act by Congress. The Justice stated that the Court's role is merely to
determine whether any conceivable rational basis existed for the limitation in question. Id. at 545-46 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The Justice further argued that a
reasonably conceivable basis existed for the limitation which was to prevent groups
from forming households merely to take advantage of the food stamp program. Id.
at 547 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
112 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (per curiam).
113 The statute, MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 32, § 26(3)(a) (West 1966), provided
as follows:
(a). . .Any... officer appointed under section nine A of chapter twentytwo.. .who has performed services in the division of state police in the
department of public safety for not less than twenty years, shall be retired by the state board of retirement upon his attaining age fifty or
upon the expiration of such twenty years, whichever last oecurs.
Murgia, 427 U.S. at 309 n. 1.
114 The Court reasoned that statutes affecting certain groups will automatically
be suspect and thus subject to strict judicial scrutiny. The Court defined a suspect
class as one " 'saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
process.' " Id. at 313 (citation omitted).
Strict judicial review will be applied when suspect classes are peculiarly disad-
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Murgia Court observed that the aged have not experienced a history of purposeful and unequal treatment nor have they been
subjected to discrimination on the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities so as to warrant the
application of a more rigorous standard of review. 115
Examining the validity of the mandatory retirement provision, the Court found that the classification was not irrelevant to
the state's proffered objective of furnishing adequate police service to the community. 1 6 The Court stated that physical ability
generally declines at the age of fifty and that the provision was a
legitimate means to ensure job fitness."' The Court asserted
that it was immaterial whether the state could have chosen alternative methods such as individual testing to ensure physical suitability for the job because imperfect classifications do not fall
within the constitutional prohibition of the equal protection
clause."t 8
A slightly higher level of rational basis review was again articulated by the Court to invalidate an ehployment discrimination statute in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.' 9 The plaintiff,
Logan, was purportedly discharged from his job because one of
his legs was shorter than the other. 20 The employer alleged that
Logan's handicap prevented him from properly performing his
job. 12 ' Logan filed an action against his employer for unlawful
conduct pursuant to the Illinois Fair Employment Practices
Act. 1 22 Under the statute, the Illinois Fair Employment Practices
Commission had to conduct a fact-finding conference within 120
days of the filing of a complaint to determine whether substantial
123
evidence supported the charges so as to proceed on the claim.
vantaged. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); McLaughlin
v. FLorida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (race); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948)
(ancestry).
Similarly, strict judicial review is also invoked when fundamental rights are infringed; see, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right of privacy); Bullock v.
Cater, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) (right to vote); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (first amendment rights); Skinner v.
Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 135 (1942) (right to procreate).
115 Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313.
116 Id. at 315-17.
117 Id. at 315.
118 Id. at 316.
119 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
120 Id. at 426.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 424-26.
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The Commission scheduled the hearing after the expiration
date.1 24 The Commission denied the employer's motion to dismiss the case for failure to hold a timely conference. 1 25 The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the decision on appeal, holding
that the statutory period expired. 126 Logan appealed alleging
due process and equal protection violations and the United
2 7
States Supreme Court reversed.

Justice Blackmun,in a separate opinion, evaluated the classifications under rational basis review.' 28 Defining minimal level
scrutiny, Justice Blackmun observed that while a state may not
have difficulty in passing this test, the standard is not a " 'toothless one.' 129 The Justice stated that the statutory scheme must
" 'rationally advanc[e] a reasonable and identifiable governmental objective.' ,,130 Applying this standard, Justice Blackmun determined that the statute was not rationally calculated to further
the express purposes of the Act which were to eliminate employment discrimination and to protect employers from unfounded
charges of discrimination.' 3 ' Rather, the effect of the artificial
deadline was possibly to allow frivolous claims to be judicially
reviewed because a timely conference was held while denying potentially meritorious claims judicial review because the state
failed to hold a timely conference.1 2 TheJustice concluded that
the statutory classifications were arbitrary because certain randomly selected claims, processed too slowly by the State, are irId. at 426.
Id.
126 Id. at 126-28.
127 Id. at 428, 438.
128 See id. at 439. The opinion of the Court disposed of the case as violative of the
due process clause. The Court held that the plaintiff's right to utilize the FEPA's
adjudicatory procedures was a property right violated by the guarantees of the due
process clause. Id. at 429. Justice Blackmun stated that "[t]he hallmark of property
•..is an individual entitlement grounded in state law, which cannot be removed
except 'for cause.' " Id. at 430 (citation omitted). The due process clause mandates
that an aggrieved party be given the "opportunity to present his case and have its
merits fairly judged." Id. at 433. The State may not destroy a property interest
without first giving the owner the chance to present his claim of entitlement, particularly where governmental error was the source of the termination of plaintiff's
rights. Id. at 434. '
129 Id. at 439 (citations omitted).
130 Id. (citation omitted).
131 Id. at 439-440.
132 Id. at 440. Justice Blackmun stated: "In other words, the State converts similarly situated claims into dissimilarly situated ones, and then uses this distinction as
the basis for its classification. This, I believe, is the very essence of arbitrary state
action. Id. at 442.
124

125

1987]

NOTES

917

revocably terminated without review. 3 3
Addressing a statutory classification affecting another unpopular group, the mentally retarded, the Court substituted the
traditional deferential rational basis test with the more aggressive
rational basis standard in order to invalidate the classification at
issue in City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center.'3 4 Justice
White, writing for the Cleburne majority, first recognized that the
operative standard to evaluate state action is that "legislation is
presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification
drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest."' 1 5 This standard is employed when social or economic
legislation is challenged. 136 Justice White indicated that the
"general rule gives way," however, when a statute makes a distinction based upon race, alienage, or national origin which are
suspect classifications. 137 In such instances, the court will only
sustain a statute based on suspect classifications if it is suitably
tailored to serve a compelling state interest.'3 M The general rule
also gives way when distinctions are based on gender or illegiti3 9
macy as they are deemed to be quasi-suspect classifications.1
Justice White declared that these types of classifications will only
be upheld if they substantially further a sufficient governmental
objective." 4
The Cleburne majority held that the court of appeals inappro'33

134
135

Id. at 442.
473 U.S. 432 (1985).
Id. at 440.

136 Id. See Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 (1981); United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979); City
of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
137 Cleburne, 432 U.S. at 440. The majority stated the classifications are suspect
because they are often the result of prejudice and antipathy and thus seldom support any legitimate state interest. Id. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
138 Cleburne, 432 U.S. at 440. Compare Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. at 365,
376 (a state statute which denied welfare benefits to aliens struck down under strict
judicial scrutiny) with Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 295-96 (1978) (statute precluding aliens from holding "important nonelective... positions" held by "officers
who participate directly in the formulation, execution, or review of broad public
policy" upheld under the intermediate level review).
139 Cleburne, 432 U.S. at 441. The majority observed that quasi-suspect classifications differ from non-suspect classifications because the characteristics of the
groups frequently bears no rational relation to their ability to perform in society.
Id. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); Mathews v.
Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
140 Cleburne, 432 U.S. at 441. Justice White noted that not every statute which
makes some type of classification is necessarily subject to close judicial review. Differential treatment of the aged is permitted when it is rationally related to a legitimate end. Id.
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priately applied intermediate level review to the class of mentally
retarded persons because they do not possess any of the indicia
of quasi-suspect classification. 14 1 justice White reasoned that
while the mentally retarded possess an immutable trait, it is precisely that trait which renders legislative action, guided by professional advice, necessary and appropriate. 142 The Justice
explained that the retarded are a large and diverse group, ranging from the mildly to the profoundly afflicted. 143 Consequently,
the judiciary is ill-informed of their particularized needs and
is
1 44
therefore unequipped to apply heightened scrutiny wisely.
The majority then observed that the distinctive legislative response to the plight of the mentally retarded, on a local and na14
tional scale, undermines any claim of prejudice and antipathy.
The federal government has enacted several statutes aimed at
remedying discrimination against the mentally retarded in the areas of education, employment, and housing.' 4 6 The Court asserted that such legislation emphasized the "real and undeniable
differences between the retarded and others." 147 Based on these
differences, the legislature must have a "certain amount of flexibility and freedom from judicial oversight in shaping and limiting
their remedial efforts."' 148 The Court further held that the legislative response also undermines the
allegation that the mentally
1 49
powerless.
politically
are
retarded
The Cleburne Court affirmed the lower court's judgment that
the ordinance was invalid as applied. 150 Justice White stated that
Id. at 442.
Id. at 443.
143 Id. at 442.
144 Id. at 443. The Court held that "[h]eightened scrutiny inevitably involves
substantive judgments about legislative decisions." Id.
145 Id.
146 Id. See Education of the Handicapped Act, 84 Stat. 175 (1970) (codified as
amended at 20 U.S.C. § § 1400-1485 (1982 and Supp. 1986)).
147 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 444.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 445. The Court stated that '[any minority can be deemed powerless to
assert direct control over the legislature, but if that were a criterion for higher level
scrutiny by the courts, much economic and social legislation would now be suspect." Id. at 445.
150 Id. at 450. The Court, in reviewing the legitimacy of the State's proffered
goals, relied on the findings of the district court. The district court stated that the
city council's insistence on a special use permit for the insane, feeble-minded, alcoholics and drug addicts, but not for multiple dwellings, boarding houses and
lodging houses, fraternity or sorority houses, dormitories, apartments, hotels, hospitals, sanitoriums, nursing homes for convalescents and the aged, was based on
the negative attitude of the majority located in the vicinity of the Featherston home.
141

142
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the state's interest in making the classification was not rationally
related to any legitimate government interest.' 51 For instance,
the council's concern that students from the junior high school
located across the street would harass the occupants of the
Featherston home was considered by the Court as "vague [and
based on] undifferentiated fears."' 5 2 The Court also dismissed
as arbitrary the council's objection to the mentally retarded occupying the home because it was located on a "five year flood
plain" while permitting the land's use for a nursing home, sanatorium, or family dwelling. 5 ' The council further argued that
the use of the home was not suitable for the number of proposed
occupants. 154 The Court, however, determined that no restrictions would have been placed on the number of occupants if the
home was used for the purposes of a boarding home, fraternity
house, or multiple dwelling. 155 Therefore, the majority concluded that the council failed to justify its decision to exclude the
mentally retarded from occupying the Featherston home.156 The
Court held that since the statute was violative of the equal protection clause as applied to the proposed residents of the group
home, the Court did not have to address the facial validity of the
ordinance. 157

In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens disapproved of
the majority's use of the "tiered approach" as an illogical means
of deciding cases.15 8 In his view, it was an inaccurate description
of the Court's approach. 59 He stated that in reality, the Court
160
applies a single standard in a "reasonably consistent fashion."'
Id. at 448. However, "negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which
are properly cognizable in a zoning proceeding, are not a permissible basis for
treating a home for the mentally retarded differently from apartment houses, multiple dwellings, and the like." Id. Significantly, the Court determined that since the
statute was violative of the equal protection clause, as applied, it need not reach the
facial validity of the ordinance. Id.
151 Id. at 450.
152 Id. at 449.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 449-50.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 450.
'57 Id. at 447.
158 Id. at 451 (Stevens, J., concurring). The Justice criticized the court of appeals
for disposing of the case as if the only question to be decided was "which of the
three clearly defined standards of equal protection review should be applied .
Id.
159 Id. The Justice argued that an analysis of case law did not "reveal three or
even two distinct standards of review." Id.
160 Id.
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The Justice opined that the cases "reflect a continuum of judgmental responses to differing classifications which have been explained in opinions by terms ranging from 'strict scrutiny' at one
extreme to 'rational basis' at the other."' 61 This is supported by
the fact that classifications such as alienage, gender, age, and
mental retardation do not fit well into any clearly defined
category.'

62

Justice Stevens further stated that in all equal protection
cases several basic questions must be asked: "What class is
harmed by the legislation and has it been subjected to a 'tradition
of disfavor' by our laws? What is the public purpose that is being
served by the law? What is the characteristic of the disadvantaged class that justifies the disparate treatment?"' 63 According
to the Justice, answers to these questions will result in the invalidation of most racial classifications and the validation of most
economic classifications. 64 Various results will occur, however,
in cases involving alienage, gender, and illegitimacy as well as the
mentally retarded. 65 For example, statutes restricting a retarded
person's right to operate hazardous equipment in employment
situations because of his reduced capabilities may be relevant to
the public interest and therefore will likely be valid.' 66 Alternatively, legislation restricting the retarded's right to vote for laws
providing for special education
are irrelevant to any public inter1 67
est and thus are invalid.

Justice Marshall, writing separately, concurred with the result, but dissented from the Court's reasoning. 68 The Justice
criticized the majority's proffered use of rational basis when, in
fact, heightened scrutiny was applied. 69 In his view, the ordiId.
162 Id. This supports the fact that the Court inconsistently applies each standard
161

of review. See supra notes 45 to 135 and accompanying text.
163 Id. at 453 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citation omitted) (footnote omitted). Justice Stevens, in applying his method of deciding cases under the equal protection
clause, inquired as to whether a "rational basis" for the classification at hand existed. Id. at 452 (Stevens, J., concurring). He further defined the term rational as
requiring that an "impartial law maker could logically believe that the classification
would serve a legitimate public purpose that transcends the harm to the members
of the disadvantaged class." Id. (footnote omitted).
164 Id. at 453 (Stevens, J., concurring).
165 Id.
166 Id. at 454 (Stevens, J., concurring).
167 Id.
168 Id. at 455 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
169 Id. at 456 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Marshall further criticized the court's in-depth analysis of heightened scrutiny as
"wholly superfluous" to the decision. TheJustice stated that the "two for the price
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nance was invalidated "only after being subjected to precisely the
170
sort of probing inquiry associated with heightened scrutiny."'
For instance, the Council's concern for fire hazards and neighborhood serenity were viewed as insufficient to justify the differential treatment of the mentally retarded. 17 1 Justice Marshall
pointed out that under traditional rational basis review, however,
the legislature may address reform one step at a time. 172 Moreover, under rational basis review, the Court does not scrutinize
the entire record to determine whether "policy decisions are
squarely supported by a firm factual foundation," as the majority
did in this case.'17 Justice Marshall observed that the majority
review of the record inappropriately shifted the burden to the
legislature to prove that the classifications drawn were
74
reasonable.'
Additionally, the dissenting Justice argued that the mentally
retarded possess the indicia often invoked when applying
"heightened judicial solicitude."' 175 For instance, the retarded
176
have experienced a long and tragic history of discrimination.
The Justice pointed to the nineteenth century laws which sought
termination of the retarded as a group by halting reproduction. 177 The mentally retarded were also denied the right to
marry, and to receive education and adequate housing.' 78 The
Justice stated that even up until 1979, states passed blanket laws
excluding the retarded, regardless of capacity, from exercising
of one" approach was unwise. Id. It violates two cardinal rules. The first is
" never [] anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of
deciding it.' " Second, " 'never [] formulate a rule of constitutional law broader
than is required by the precise facts.' " Id. at 457 (Marshall, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (citation omitted).
170 Id. at 458 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
171 Id.
172 Id. at 459 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
173 Id.
174 Id. at 460 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Marshall opined that the majority's failure to acknowledge that it utilized a more
vigorous level of review was unfortunate in several aspects. First, it paved the way
for the courts to apply a more searching level of review under the guise of rational
basis to areas of economic and commercial legislation in the future. Id. Further, the
majority failed to articulate the circumstances which would trigger the "second order" rational basis test, thus leaving the lower courts in the dark. Id.
175 Id. at 463-65 (Marshall,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See supra
notes 1 to 12 and accompanying text (discussing plight of mentally retarded).
176 Cleburme, 473 U.S. at 463-65 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
177 Id. at 463 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
178 Id. at 463-64 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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their fundamental right to vote. 179

Consequently, Justice Marshall was compelled to dissent
from the Court's unprecedented decision to leave an ordinance
which rested on "irrational prejudice" standing.' 80 In his view
the majority perhaps believed that the same application of the
statute was constitutional with respect to a subgroup of the mentally retarded under different circumstances.'' The dissent argued that a new carefully tailored statute should be drafted that
would exclude a well defined subgroup of the mentally retarded
under special circumstances. 8 2 However, as a result of the majority's opinion, a statute containing a sweeping exclusion of all
mentally persons remained controlling.18 3 The Justice asserted
that this approach was problematic in that no guidelines were
established as to what applications of the statute would be
valid.' 8 4 Consequently, the same Council members who originally applied the statute based on "vague, undifferentiated
fears," were still left to employ their "standardless discretion" in
future cases.'8 5 Justice Marshall condemned the Court for invalidating the statute only as applied. 8 6 In his view, statutes resting
result in the invalion impermissibly overbroad generalizations
8 7
dation of the presumption of validity.'

The Cleburne decision has reaffirmed the proposition that the
Court actually employs one rather than three distinct levels of
179 Id. at 464 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Justice
reasoned that because the mentally retarded continue to experience the "ignorance, irrational fears, and stereotyping that long have plagued them," statutes affecting them should be given "searching" judicial review. Id. (footnote omitted).
Consequently, Cleburne's "vague generalizations for grouping the 'feeble-minded'
with drug addicts, alcoholics, and the insane" and excluding them from establishing homes, while at the same time granting this right to the "elderly, the ill, the
boarder, and the transient" are unfounded and overbroad. Id. at 465 (Marshall, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted).
180 Id. at 473 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
181 Id. at 474-75 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
182 Id. at 475 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). More specifically,Justice Marshall noted that the city should study the nature of the problem,
make the "appropriate policy decisions [and] enact a new, more narrowly tailored
ordinance. That ordinance might well look very different from the current one; it
might separate group homes (presently treated nowhere in the ordinance) from
hospitals and it might define a narrow sub-class of the retarded from whom even'
group homes could legitimately be excluded." Id.
183 Id.
184

Id.

185

Id. at 474 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

186

Id.

187 Id. at 476 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)(footnote
omitted).
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review. 8" In Cleburne, the Court articulated the traditional deferential rational basis review, yet reached its decision only after
conducting a probing inquiry into the reasonableness of the legislative goals and means, the specific interests at stake, and the
relative importance of those interests to the burdened class. 8 9
As Justice Stevens correctly stated in his concurrence, the tiered
approach to equal protection claims " 'is a method the Court has
employed to explain decisions that actually apply a single standard in a reasonably consistent fashion.'

"'

This pretense is,

however, unwise. Personal rights and interests do -not fit well
into clearly defined categories. Therefore, the Court will often
base its decisions on factors not encompassed within the articulated standard.' 9 ' As a result, interested parties are provided
with no notice of the standards which may govern their cases and
lower courts are left with no framework within which to reach
their decisions. 192 The entire process undermines the need for
predictability and legitimacy.
The unprecedented and novel use of the as applied doctrine
in Cleburne, is the product of the Court's pretense in applying the
tiered approach to equal protection claims. For instance, the majority, in attempting to maintain its deferential posture under rational basis review, invalidated the ordinance only as-applied to
the proposed residents of the group home. 93 Thus, the ordinance was left intact. This doctrinal change in the area of equal
protection yields precisely the opposite result that the Court traditionally wishes to achieve under minimum level review. The
effect of the decision was to expand the scope of minimal level
review by paving the way for litigants to challenge social and economic legislation as applied to each particular plaintiff.
188 Id. at 451 (Stevens, J., concurring).
189 Id. at 458-59 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
190 Id. at 452 (citation omitted) (Stevens, J., concurring). An analysis of the case
law reveals that the articulated standards applied under equal protection analysis
are always shifting. While the articulated tests may change with each case, the
Court really approaches each case in the same manner. The Court defines the specific interests at stake and the relative importance of those interests to the burdened
class and to the legislative goals and means. See supra notes 45 to 135 and accompanying text.
191 See supra notes 151-157 and accompanying text.
192 Justice Marshall noted that because the Court based its decision on factors
not encompassed within the standard, the interested parties were not afforded with
notice that the Court was going to use the as applied approach. Consequently, the
parties did not address the standard in their briefs or at oral argument. Cleburne,
473 U.S. at 477-78 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
193 Id. at 447.
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The decision also increased the scope of mere rational scrutiny and the power to review social and economic legislation. As
a result, the Court has unwisely assumed the burden of addressing complex policy questions involved in updating statutes like
the one in Cleburne. Legislation, as opposed to case-by-case judicial rulings, would provide certainty to both the retarded community and to administrative officials in applying the ordinance.
Ironically, the majority in Cleburne declined to apply heightened
review because the judiciary was deemed "ill-informed" to make
substantive judgments concerning the special needs of the large
and diverse group of retarded persons. 194 However, the effect of
the "as-applied" approach will inevitably involve substantive
judgments concerning matters which should be addressed by
state legislatures.
The problem with the tiered approach in equal protection
analysis is that courts dispose of cases as if the only question to
be decided is what level of scrutiny should be applied. 195 Relatively little attention is devoted to the most crucial question,
namely, whether a person has been unfairly denied equal protection of the laws. The Court's "style emphasizes [a] formalized
doctrine expressed in elaborately layered sets of 'tests' or
'prongs' or 'requirements' or 'standards' or 'hurdles,' "196 over
the fundamental importance of identifying the interests at stake
and whether a classification rests on false stereotypes regarding
individual groups. As Justice Holmes stated in Lochner v. New
York, "[g]eneral propositions do not decide concrete cases. The
decision will depend on a judgment or intuition more subtle than
9
any articulate major premise." 1 7
Lynn Menschenfreund
194 Id. at 443.

Id. at 451 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICHIGAN LAw REV. 165, 165 (1985).
197 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
195
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